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Abstract 
Between 2003 and 2014 the European Union’s (EU) Border Management Programme 
in Central Asia was implemented by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). However, the latter’s implementing responsibilities have just come to an end, 
with the next phase of the programme to be implemented by an EU member state 
consortium. This paper seeks to explain why the EU chose the UNDP to implement the 
programme in the first place; why the programme was redelegated to the UNDP 
over successive phases; and why, in the end, the EU has opted for a member state 
consortium to implement the next phase of the programme.  
The paper will draw on two alternative accounts of delegation: the principal-agent 
approach and normative institutionalism. Ultimately, it will be argued that both the 
EU’s decision(s) to delegate (and redelegate) implementing responsibilities to the 
UNDP, and its subsequent decision to drop the organisation in favour of an EU 
member state consortium, were driven for the most part by a rationalist ‘logic of 
consequentiality’. At the same time, a potential secondary role of a normative 
institutionalist ‘logic of appropriateness’ – as a supplementary approach – will not be 
discounted. 
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Introduction 
The Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) is an EU programme 
tasked with the delivery of capacity-building and infrastructural assistance to the 
governments of five Central Asian states: Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. These states are afflicted by numerous problems, from 
Afghan heroin trafficking to disputed borders, from periodic flare-ups in religious 
extremism and ethnic violence, to arbitrary, corrupt and militarised border regimes 
which stifle trade and the movement of people.1 
The tasks assigned to BOMCA have covered at various points in time the training of 
border guards and customs officers; the provision of equipment and drug sniffer 
dogs; the construction and renovation of border infrastructure; the organisation of 
workshops and study trips to EU member states; assistance with legal and institutional 
reform; the facilitation of regional trade and transit; the capacity-building of national 
law enforcement agencies (via a ‘train the trainers’ approach); and the promotion 
of regional cooperation on border controls.2 Since the inception of its second phase 
(BOMCA 2) in 2003, BOMCA has been implemented in successive phases by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). However, it was BOMCA 4 
(implemented between January 2004 and December 2007) that was the first major, 
multi-annual phase of the programme. Since then there have been four subsequent 
phases of the programme, culminating with BOMCA 8 which began in July 2011 and 
expired on 30 June 2014. The next phase, BOMCA 9, will be implemented by an EU 
member state consortium rather than by the UNDP, and is at the time of writing 
unscheduled. 
BOMCA is funded jointly by the EU and the UNDP, with the organisations’ contribu-
tions as a share of the programme’s budget hovering at around ninety per cent and 
                                                          
1 See International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential: Executive 
Summary and Recommendations, ICG Asia Report, no. 33, 4 April 2002; J. Boonstra, E. Marat 
and V. Axyonova, Security Sector Reform in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: What Role 
for Europe? Working paper, no. 14, EUCAM, Brussels, May 2013; G. Gavrilis, Beyond the Border 
Management Programme for Central Asia (BOMCA), Policy brief, EUCAM, no. 11, November 
2009; G. Gavrilis, Central Asia’s Border Woes & the Impact of International Assistance, 
Occasional Papers Series, Central Eurasia Project, no. 6, New York, May 2012. 
2 See Particip, Thematic Global Evaluation of the European Union’s Support to Integrated 
Border Management and Fight against Organised Crime, Final Report, vol. 3b, April 2013, 
p.290, for an overview of BOMCA’s objectives since BOMCA 4. 
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ten per cent respectively.3 The UNDP is a UN programme tasked with assisting 
countries with their development. Their website identifies four focal areas of activity: 
“poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs [Millennium Development 
Goals]”; “democratic governance”; “crisis prevention and recovery”; and “environ-
ment and energy for sustainable development”.4 The EU, through the European 
Commission, has a strong operational relationship with UN organisations that is 
codified in the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) laying 
down the terms of cooperation between the EU and UN organisations in the 
implementation of external assistance programmes.5  
BOMCA represents an interesting case for several reasons, which serve to justify its 
selection as a case study. First, the relative scope of the programme represents a 
substantial stake for both the EU and the UNDP.6 In terms of time and money, 
BOMCA represents one of the EU’s most significant commitments to Central Asia, 
and it is a key pillar of the Union’s vaunted Central Asia Strategy.7 The UNDP, as co-
donor as well as implementing organisation, has also invested significant financial 
and reputational resources in the programme. Second, unlike for previous phases, 
the contract for the next phase of the programme (BOMCA 9) will be tendered. 
Since only Europe-based organisations will be eligible to apply for the contract, the 
EU’s relationship with the UNDP in the context of BOMCA has necessarily come to an 
end. This period of transition represents a prime opportunity to analyse both the 
motives behind the delegation – and subsequent redelegations – of implementing 
authority to the UNDP and the reasons for which the EU has chosen to terminate the 
relationship. 
The paper will proceed as follows. First, two accounts of why actors decide to 
delegate authority will be considered: one supplied by the principal-agent (PA) 
                                                          
3 Border Management Programme in Central Asia, About Us, undated, retrieved 27 March 
2014, http://bomca.eu/en/about-us.html: “BOMCA's accumulated budgets from 2003-2014 
amount to € 33,555,405. UNDP, the implementing agency of BOMCA, has co-funded the 
programme with € 2.74 million.” 
4 United Nations Development Programme, About Us – A World of Development Experience, 
undated, retrieved 7 April 2014, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/ 
about_us.html.  
5 Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement between the European Community, 
represented by the Commission of the European Communities, and the United Nations 
(FAFA), 1994, revised in 2003. 
6 The budget of BOMCA, although limited in absolute terms, is significant in comparison with 
other EU interventions in the region. 
7 European Union, The European Union and Central Asia: A New Partnership in Action, 
Luxembourg: DGF-Communication/Publications, June 2009. 
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approach; the other by normative institutionalism. Second, these approaches will be 
applied in turn in an attempt to explain the EU’s decision to delegate (and 
redelegate) implementing authority to the UNDP in the context of BOMCA. It will be 
demonstrated that this first set of decisions is best explained by the consequentialist 
account of delegation furnished by the PA approach. Third, the paper will consider 
the rationale behind the EU’s decision to terminate the relationship with the UNDP in 
the context of BOMCA and transfer implementation responsibilities to an EU member 
state consortium. Here again, it will be demonstrated that the account offered by 
the principal-agent approach provides the most fitting explanation for the EU’s 
decision. The paper will conclude by going slightly deeper, showing how the 
consequence-driven motives underlying the EU’s two sets of decisions underwent a 
shift – from a preponderant focus on programme effectiveness and common 
preferences, to a greater concern for visibility, reflecting the Union’s increasing 
interest in enhancing its profile as a political player in Central Asia and the world. 
Two Accounts of the Decision to Delegate 
A Principal-Agent Account of the Act of Delegation 
The principal-agent approach is, according to Moe, “the analytic expression of the 
agency relationship in which one party, the principal, considers entering into a 
contractual relationship with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent 
will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the principal”.8 
Though an apt definition, PA theorists have not confined themselves to analyses of 
the agency relationship itself in its different forms; they have also devoted much time 
to considering the motives that can lie behind actors’ decisions to delegate 
authority.9 Indeed, the PA approach offers the most developed account of delega-
tion decisions, and it is for this reason that it is considered here.10 In reality, while there 
are variations of the PA approach, they are all essentially rationalist, premised on the 
assumption that individuals are more or less rational utility-maximisers who base their 
                                                          
8 T. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization”, American Journal of Political Science, 28(4), 
November 1984, p. 756. 
9 For a principal-agent analysis of the relationship between the EU and the UNDP in the 
context of BOMCA, see J. Gartland, The EU’s Border Management Programme in Central Asia 
Explaining Delegation and Agency, Master’s thesis, Bruges: College of Europe, 2014. 
10 The literature is especially developed as regards delegation by the United States Congress. 
See D. R. Kiewiet and M. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the 
Appropriations Process, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991; M. McCubbins and T. 
Page, “A Theory of Congressional Delegation”, in M. McCubbins and T. Sullivan (eds.), 
Congress: Structure and Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 409-425. 
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decisions on logically-expected outcomes.11 It follows that actors decide to 
delegate authority where they anticipate, on the basis of a rational decision-making 
process, that such a decision will increase their utility. Decisions to delegate will there-
fore be determined by what March and Olsen term a ‘logic of consequentiality’.12  
Indeed, for Hawkins et al., “all delegation is based upon a division of labor and gains 
from specialization”, where gains are clearly synonymous with increases to utility.13 
However, specific motives for delegation can vary according to the context. Indeed, 
applied to policy-making, PA approaches have uncovered a range of motives for 
delegation, some of which (though by no means all) are also relevant to cases of 
delegation to an implementing agent. All falling under a logic of consequentiality, 
three of these motives are considered here. These are: efficiency; accountability; 
and common preferences. 
Majone, in his study of delegation to the EU, argues that member states often 
delegate authority in order to reduce the costs of decision-making.14 By delegating 
authority to the European Commission, for example, member states may reduce the 
costs of decision-making by relying on the institution’s accumulated expertise to 
guide policy formulation. Taken out of a policy-making context, this same efficiency-
oriented logic might be applied to an actor’s decision to delegate responsibility for 
the implementation of a policy. Though the scenario is different, the rationale 
remains the same. It pertains to the recruitment of an agent for the execution of a 
task where this would be more costly when undertaken by the principal directly. 
Utilising the PA account of delegation, it is logical that in both a policy-making and 
an implementation scenario a rational actor should delegate in order to make cost 
savings. Where the implementation of an external assistance task is delegated, such 
efficiency considerations may comprise inter alia a desire for policy-relevant 
expertise, a need for infrastructure, or a need for personnel with diplomatic 
accreditation. 
                                                          
11 C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 1976, p. 308.  
12 J. March and J. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, New 
York: The Free Press, 1989, pp. 21-26. Although March and Olsen are normative institutionalists 
rather than PA theorists, their ‘logic of consequentiality’ is concise and eloquent as a term 
and will for these reasons be employed here.  
13 D. Hawkins et al., “Introduction”, in D. Hawkins et al. (eds.), Delegation and Agency in 
International Organizations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p.13. 
14 G. Majone, “Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance”, 
European Union Politics, 2(1), 2001, p. 103. 
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Second, actors’ common preferences can also play a role in the decision to 
delegate. Preferences are less relevant to the question of ‘why delegate?’ than that 
of ‘whom to delegate to?’. Principals are more likely to delegate to agents with 
similar preferences, since this generally reduces the likelihood of their incurring 
significant agency costs (that is, utility loss).15 This is what Bendor, Glazer and 
Hammond have termed the ‘ally principle’.16 Arguing that this principle holds fairly 
generally, they suggest that it is only in situations marked by problems of ‘credible 
commitment’ – less relevant to the delegation of tasks than to situations where 
policy-making authority is transferred – that a principal will delegate to an agent with 
obviously different preferences.17 Given that decisions to delegate to agents with 
similar preferences are assumed to be driven by a principal’s rational desire to 
reduce future costs to be borne by itself, this motive can be grouped, along with 
efficiency considerations, under a logic of consequentiality. 18 
A desire on the part of the potential principal to transfer, or at least distribute, 
accountability may offer a final motive for delegation relevant to the case of 
BOMCA. Also known as ‘blame shifting’, accountability considerations have gained 
currency as a motive for delegation, especially in the context of delegation to the 
EU.19 Applied to another case, Rodrik argues that the delegation of lending authority 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as an ostensibly ‘neutral’ entity may have 
been an attempt by international creditors to deflect international criticism of the 
‘politicisation’ of lending.20 Here, the creditors, as principals of the IMF, reacted in 
response to failure. Yet this logic may also take on a pre-emptive character. Where 
the pursuit of objectives entails risks, an actor may recruit an agent to provide the 
former with a means of avoiding or shifting blame should something go wrong.21 
Clearly, based as they are on the rational interest of the principal to preserve its 
                                                          
15 M. Pollack, “The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting 
in the EU, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 32-33; Majone, op. cit., p. 104. 
16 J. Bendor, A. Glazer and T. Hammond, “Theories of Delegation in Political Science”, 
Research Paper Series, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Research Paper, no. 
1655, September 2000, pp. 1-38.  
17 Ibid., pp. 25-27. 
18 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, op. cit., pp. 21-26. 
19 J. Tallberg, “Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What 
Consequences?”, West European Politics, 25(1), 2002, p. 27. 
20 D. Rodrik, “Why Is There Multilateral Lending?”, in M. Bruno and B. Pleskovic (eds.), Annual 
World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 
1996, pp. 180-181. 
21 B. Martens, “Why do aid agencies exist?”, Development Policy Review, 32(6), 2005, pp. 656-
657. 
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utility, accountability considerations can also be grouped under the PA logic of 
consequentiality. 
A Normative Institutionalist Account of the Act of Delegation 
In many ways, normative institutionalism can be regarded as a foil to the PA 
approach. The theory is one of the variants of the ‘new institutionalism’, developed in 
reaction to the dominance of rational choice and behaviouralist approaches in 
political science.22 Most of the new institutionalisms are averse to approaches that 
emphasise individuals’ capacity for rational decision-making, focusing instead on the 
importance of institutions in shaping political behaviour.23 For institutionalists 
therefore, “the organization of political life makes a difference”.24 
Drawing on sociology, normative institutionalists conceive of institutions in a broader 
manner than did the ‘old institutionalists’. Institutions are taken to encompass not just 
formal rules and practices, but also stable, recurring patterns of behaviour.25 For 
normative institutionalists, these institutions broadly defined “actually embody values 
… and determine ‘appropriate’ behaviour within given settings”.26 As such, for 
normative institutionalists, “action is often based more on identifying the normatively 
appropriate behavior than on calculating the return expected from alternative 
policy choices”.27 This mode of behaviour is what March and Olsen call a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’.28  
Whereas principal-agent theory can only be applied to situations of delegation, 
normative institutionalism can be applied to any arena of individual behaviour 
where institutions exist. It is for this reason that the normative institutionalist account of 
delegation is less developed than the one put forward by the PA approach. 
Nevertheless, there are instances where sociological institutionalism has been 
applied to instances of delegation. Sociological institutionalism can be considered 
an analogue of normative institutionalism, sharing its broad conception of institutions 
                                                          
22 D. Ross, “The Many Lives of Institutionalism in American Social Science”, Polity, 28(1), 
Autumn 1995, p. 121. 
23 V. Lowndes, “Institutionalism”, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in 
Political Science, 2nd edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 94. 
24 J. March and J. Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life”, The 
American Political Science Review, 78(3), September 1984, p. 747. 
25 R. Goodin, “Institutions and Their Design”, in R. Goodin (ed.), The Theory of Institutional 
Design, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 22. 
26 Lowndes, op. cit., p. 95. 
27 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, op. cit., p. 22. 
28 Ibid., pp. 21-26. 
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and its emphasis on situation-appropriate behaviour. McNamara, for instance, taking 
up the example of central bank independence, highlights the influence of social 
norms on an actor’s decision to delegate authority.29 She argues that past 
governmental decisions to grant independence to national central banks have 
been based less on economic considerations and more on a social logic that 
regards central bank independence as desirable and legitimate.30  
Normative institutionalism would likewise argue that decisions to delegate are 
determined by institutions shaping appropriate behaviour, rather than by rational 
calculations of consequences. March and Olsen argue that this logic of 
appropriateness is conditioned by four litanies of action: “What kind of situation is 
this?”, “Who am I?”, “How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation?”, 
and “Do what is more appropriate”.31 These litanies are contrasted with those of the 
logic of consequentiality: “What are my alternatives?”, “What are my values?”, 
“What are the consequences of my alternatives for my values?”, “Choose the 
alternative that has the best consequences”.32 Applied to a decision to delegate, it 
is clear that it is not only appropriate behaviour determined by situation-specific 
institutions that bear on an actor’s decision (“What kind of situation is this?”), but also 
the very identity of the actor (“Who am I?”). 
With regards to BOMCA, the PA approach would expect that the EU’s selection of 
the UNDP as implementing partner for the programme and its subsequent decision to 
drop the UNDP in favour of a member state consortium were informed by rational 
calculations of consequences on the part of the decision makers in the EU. By 
contrast, normative institutionalism would attribute these decisions to the logics of 
appropriate behaviour determined by situation-specific institutions within the EU. 
                                                          
29 K. McNamara, “Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of 
Delegation”, West European Politics, 25(1), 2002, pp. 47-76. 
30 Ibid. 
31 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, op. cit., p. 23. 
32 Ibid. 
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The EU and Delegation to UN Organisations 
The Process of Delegation under Joint Management 
Until the coming into force of the EU’s new financial regulation in January 2014,33 the 
European Commission had specific procedures in place for the delegation of tasks 
to international organisations under the budget allocation modality of joint 
management.34 Unlike the process for awarding grants, delegation to an 
international organisation under the former system did not follow a call for proposals 
but instead entailed a simple transfer of tasks. In both instances, the decision to 
delegate to an international organisation was taken by the relevant officials in the 
Commission – in Directorate-General (DG) Development and Cooperation-
EuropeAid (DEVCO), DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), or their past 
functional equivalents – with the presenting of an Action Fiche (drawn up by an 
official in delegation or a private contractor) to a management committee. This 
Fiche was then presented to the implementing organisation and a Contribution-
Specific Agreement (CSA), accompanied by several annexes describing in more 
detail the action and budgets, was signed.35 
Deciding to Delegate 
It is worth considering why the EU decided to delegate the implementation of 
BOMCA at all, rather than execute it itself. Here, it is important to remember the 
position of the EU in 2002-03 when the project was first conceived. Three factors 
mitigated against the direct implementation of BOMCA by the European 
Commission. First, only one Commission Delegation was present in the region at the 
time, in Almaty, Kazakhstan. Commission implementation of the project in all five 
Central Asian states as envisaged would have required the establishment of 
operational bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, entailing 
significant costs.36 Second, the Commission did not – and perhaps still does not – 
possess the manpower and expertise necessary to implement a multi-country border 
                                                          
33 European Union, “Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of 
the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L 298, 26 October 2012. 
34 Council of the European Union, “Council Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No 1605/2002 of 25 
June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 248, 16 September 2002, Art. 53. 
35 Interview with European Commission official A, DG DEVCO, via telephone, 26 March 2014. 
36 Ibid. 
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management programme in a then-unfamiliar region.37 This factor is related to the 
efficiency considerations sketched above as a motive for delegation under the PA 
approach, and concerns especially the demand for policy-relevant expertise. Third, 
BOMCA, along with the Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP),38 was the 
EU’s first significant security-oriented intervention in Central Asia. It is possible that the 
uncertain prospects of the mission, especially given the unstable political situation in 
the region, rendered attractive the option of delegation as a way of avoiding (or 
perhaps shifting) blame in the event of any major operational setbacks. 
Selecting the UNDP as Agent 
That leads on to the next question, namely why the UNDP was chosen specifically for 
the implementation of BOMCA. The normative institutionalist account of delegation 
will be considered first. Accordingly, it might be suggested that the delegation of 
BOMCA’s implementation to the UNDP was considered to be appropriate in the 
context of the institutions specific to the situation and in relation to the identities of 
the key decision-makers in the European Commission. Two arguments might be 
deployed to support this claim. 
First, the EU has always defined its international identity in relation to the UN. The latter 
has a special place in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which commits the EU to 
“promote multilateral solutions to common problems, particularly in the framework of 
the United Nations” and subscribes the Union to “the purposes and principles of the 
UN Charter”.39 The special relationship between the EU and the UN is marked by a 
discourse of deep cooperation, which is as evident in the ‘spirit of partnership’ 
                                                          
37 Ibid.; Interview with European Commission official B, European Delegation (EUD) in Bishkek, 
via telephone, 22 March 2014. 
38 See European Commission Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, The Central Asia 
Drug Action Programme (CADAP), updated 31 August 2012, retrieved 21 March 2014, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/asia/regional-cooperation-central-asia/border-
management-fight-against-drugs/cadap_en.htm. 
39 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007”, Official Journal of the 
European Union, C115, 9 May 2008, Art. 21(1) para. 2 TEU and Art. 21(2)(c) TEU. See also Art. 
208(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which relates to development 
cooperation specifically and underlines the EU’s commitments and objectives “in the context 
of the United Nations and other competent international organisations.” 
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underpinning the FAFA as in official dispatches.40 The identity of officials at the 
European Commission is therefore in part constituted by the relationship between 
their organisation and the United Nations. It might be supposed that delegation of 
BOMCA to the UNDP was conceived of as an appropriate course of action from the 
perspective of identity. 
Second, the UNDP in particular is a highly significant agent of the EU in the 
implementation of the EU’s external assistance. Indeed, its importance is supported 
by data: between 2000 and 2011 the Commission donated just under three billion 
Euro to the organisation, close to a third of all EU funds channelled to UN 
organisations during this period and almost three times as much as to the UN Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA), the next biggest recipient of EU funds of the UN 
family.41 Delegation to the UNDP seems quite clearly to be a fairly stable, recurring 
pattern of behaviour, potentially falling into Goodin’s definition of an institution within 
the Commission.42 It could be that the delegation of external assistance programmes 
to the UNDP is expected of EU decision-makers,43 determining their behaviour in such 
situations. Normative institutionalists might argue that the identity of EU decision-
makers combined with situation-specific expectations to generate the successive 
decisions to delegate authority for the implementation of BOMCA to the UNDP. 
While not speaking for other cases of delegation to UN organisations, it is argued 
here that consequentialist logics played a greater role in the decision to delegate 
the implementation of BOMCA to the UNDP. Each official interviewed was explicitly 
asked two questions relating to the decision to delegate. The first: what informed the 
EU’s decision to delegate to the UNDP? The second: why has the EU maintained its 
operational relationship with the UNDP in the context of BOMCA? On the basis of 
interviews conducted, it seems that the decision to delegate to the UNDP in 2003 
was driven much more by a PA-style logic of consequentiality than by a normative 
                                                          
40 See Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement, op. cit.; Commission of the 
European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of 
multilateralism, COM(2003) 526 final, Brussels, 10 September 2003; Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning the establishment of a strategic partnership between The 
European Commission and the United Nations Development Programme, 28 June 2004. 
41 DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid Cooperation Office, EuropeAid Financial 
Contributions to the UN, 2012, retrieved 15 April 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/ 
who/partners/international-organisations/documents/europeaid_financial_contributions_to_ 
the_un2010-2011_full.pdf. 
42 Goodin, op. cit., p. 22. 
43 Ibid., p.19. 
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institutionalist logic of appropriateness. Those interviewed considered the UNDP to 
possess a number of advantages that equipped it to handle the implementation of 
the project. 
First, the extensive infrastructure of the UNDP in the region, with Country Offices in all 
five Central Asian states, had a strong bearing on the EU’s decision.44 These Country 
Offices offered BOMCA ready-to-go financial, procurement and administrative 
support structures which would have taken a non-embedded implementing 
organisation months (if not years) to set up. Second, the UNDP enjoys a close 
relationship with the governments in the region, due in part to the organisation’s 
status as the largest multilateral donor in the region, and in part to its reputation as 
an independent and impartial development agency.45 These relationships have 
given the EU the opportunity to push BOMCA into sovereignty-sensitive areas that 
would have been off-limits to agents other than the UNDP.46 Third, and closely 
related, UNDP staff enjoy official accreditation to the governments of Central Asia as 
members of the UN ‘family’. This has allowed the EU to avoid procedural costs that 
would have had to be borne had implementation been entrusted to a non-
accredited organisation.47 Fourth, the UNDP’s procurement processes enable the 
UNDP to procure goods and services more efficiently than other potential 
implementing organisations.48 Given that there were no other development 
organisations in Central Asia at that time that could rival the capacity of the UNDP to 
implement such a programme, the organisation was in many ways the obvious 
choice. 
These results tally with those collected by the European Court of Auditors in its 2009 
report on EU assistance implemented through the UN.49 The Court issued fifty-two 
questionnaires to Commission officials working in the areas of humanitarian aid and 
development, asking respondents to list the three most important reasons for 
delegation to the UN. Summarising, the Court found that “the Commission chooses 
                                                          
44 Ibid.; Interview with BOMCA official 1, Regional Programme Management Office (RPMO), 
via telephone, 13 March 2014. 
45 Interview with European Commission official C, European Delegation (EUD) in Bishkek, via 
telephone, 18 July 2014. 
46 Commission official C (EUD Bishkek), op. cit. 
47 Ibid.; BOMCA official 1 (RPMO), op. cit. 
48 BOMCA official 1 (RPMO), op. cit.; Commission official B (EUD Bishkek), op. cit. 
49 European Court of Auditors, EU Assistance Implemented Through United Nations 
Organisations: Decision-Making and Monitoring, Special Report no. 15, Luxembourg: Office 
for Publications of the European Union, 2009. 
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to work with the UN primarily for attributes linked to its capacity to deliver, such as its 
experience, expertise, logistical capacity and past performance”.50 Indeed, the 
Commission official responsible for the management of BOMCA in Brussels did not 
accept that the selection of the UNDP was due to any special status for the UNDP as 
the ‘natural’ choice for the EU.51 His preference for what the European Court of 
Auditors has called the UN’s ‘capacity to deliver’ was apparently a product of a 
logic of consequentiality (via efficiency) rather than a logic of appropriateness. 
Evidence suggests that efficiency considerations were also central to the EU’s 
decisions to redelegate responsibility to the UNDP over successive phases of the 
programme. “Good performance of the UNDP in previous and ongoing programme 
phases” along with “high beneficiary satisfaction” are listed as contributing factors to 
the EU’s decision to redelegate to the UNDP for the eighth phase of the 
programme.52 This was corroborated by interviews: EU officials pointed to satisfaction 
of beneficiaries with the UNDP’s management of the programme.53 Indeed, BOMCA 
is widely seen as successful in bolstering the border management capacities of the 
Central Asian states. The final evaluation of BOMCA 6 and BOMCA 7 concluded that 
“much has been delivered by BOMCA in terms of training and infrastructure with a 
relatively modest overall budget”,54 while one analyst has described it as “an 
outstanding model of border control assistance”.55 BOMCA has also been successful 
in engaging authoritarian regimes such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, usually 
sceptical of EU projects, which have been sympathetic to the programme’s 
capacity-building and anti-trafficking agendas.56 This consideration of past 
performance is clearly driven by a concern for efficiency that is in line with the 
consequentialist logic put forward by PA theorists as the basis for delegation 
decisions. Indeed, no evidence was found that the repeated redelegation of 
authority to the UNDP was undertaken according to a logic of appropriate 
behaviour.  
                                                          
50 Ibid., p. 15. 
51 Commission official A (DG DEVCO Brussels), op. cit. 
52 European Commission AIDCO/2009/DCI, Action Fiche No 4 for Central Asia, Border 
Management in Central Asia – Phase 8 (BOMCA 8), DCI-ASIE/2009/021-058, 2009, p. 11. 
53 Commission official C (EUD Bishkek), op. cit. 
54 SOGES, Evaluation of the BOMCA Programme (Border Management in Central Asia), Final 
Report Draft, FRAMEWORK CONTRACT COMMISSION 2007 Lot Nr 4 Contract Nr 2009/219308, 
December 2010, p. 28. 
55 Gavrilis, Beyond BOMCA, op. cit., p. 4. 
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Preferences have also had a role to play in the decision to delegate to the UNDP, 
albeit a secondary one. As abovementioned, the EU and the UN organisations share 
many values – the institutions and member states of the EU are, after all, committed 
to “the purposes and principles of the UN Charter”.57 The similar values of the UNDP 
to the EU were cited as a motivation for delegation to the organisation,58 with one EU 
official in Bishkek referring to the “common agenda” of the EU and the UN.59 
Preferences seem to have had as much of a role to play in the decision to 
redelegate responsibility to the UNDP: the BOMCA 8 Action Fiche cites the “UNDP's 
high interest in human rights matters” as a factor in the Commission’s decision to 
reemploy the UNDP for the eighth phase of the programme.60 In line with the ally 
principle, significant preference overlaps, for example in areas like human rights, 
reduce the risk of noncompliance and therefore agency loss.61 Empirically however, 
while it is clear that preferences did play a role in the EU’s decision to delegate to 
the UNDP, it is difficult to determine whether this was because of the ally principle 
(driven by consequentialism), or because respect for human rights has become an 
institution within the European Commission, following which only delegation to 
organisations upholding such values is considered appropriate. Most probably, both 
logics played a part in the Commission officials’ decision to delegate (and 
redelegate) to the UNDP. 
Interestingly, none of the officials interviewed cited accountability as a motive for 
delegation. It should be noted, however, that demonstrating such a motive is 
methodologically highly problematic, since officials are naturally reluctant to 
acknowledge efforts to avoid accountability. At most, it may be speculated that the 
EU’s limited involvement in Central Asia in the early 2000s rendered uncertain the 
initial prospects of BOMCA and therefore increased the attractiveness of delegation 
to the UNDP as a way of shifting blame in case the project failed. However, this 
paper would not support such a conclusion without further evidence. 
                                                          
57 European Union, “Consolidated Treaties”, op. cit., Art. 21(1) para. 2 TEU and Art. 21(2)(c) 
TEU. 
58 Interview with Commission official A (DG DEVCO Brussels), op. cit. 
59 Commission official C (EUD Bishkek), op. cit. 
60 European Commission AIDCO/2009/DCI, op. cit., p. 11. 
61 Bendor, Glazer and Hammond, op. cit., pp. 1-38. 
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Changing Partners 
The Border Management Programme in Central Asia is about to undergo an 
important transition. BOMCA 8 was terminated on the 30 June 2014; with it ended the 
EU’s operational relationship with the UNDP in the context of the programme. 
Although the contract for the next phase of the programme will be tendered, non-
Europe-based international organisations will be barred from making proposals.62 The 
Action Fiche for BOMCA 9 lists the preferred implementation modality as an 
international consortium of EU member states in cooperation with international 
organisations (potentially including the International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development [ICMPD]).63 This would see BOMCA following in the footsteps of the 
Central Asian Drug Action Programme, an EU-funded assistance programme that 
aims to improve the criminal and sanitary treatment of drug addicts in the five 
Central Asian states. The first four CADAP phases were, like BOMCA, implemented by 
the UNDP, but implementing responsibilities for CADAP 5 were handed over to a 
member state consortium led by the German development agency GIZ (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit).64 
Explaining the Termination of the Relationship with the UNDP 
EU officials were positive about the results of BOMCA overall and were adamant that 
the termination of the relationship should not be seen as a negative reflection of the 
UNDP’s performance.65 Nevertheless, the responsible Commission official made 
reference to efficiency considerations as the motivation behind the termination of 
the relationship with the UNDP from the end of BOMCA phase 8. There was a 
conviction that ‘we [the EU] can do better’.66 In part, this sentiment was due to the 
changing nature of the programme. Since BOMCA 6, the programme has moved 
towards a training and capacity-building logic, while old priorities, such as the 
renovation of border infrastructure and the provision of equipment, have become 
progressively less central.67 This shift has increased the need for expert trainers and 
specialists, a need that the UNDP, with its complex recruitment procedures, is not 
                                                          
62 Commission official A (DG DEVCO Brussels), op. cit. 
63 Interview with International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) employee, 
via telephone, 27 March 2014. The Action Fiche for BOMCA 9 is not currently publicly 
available. 
64 See European Commission Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, op. cit. 
65 Commission official A (DG DEVCO Brussels), op. cit., Commission official C, op. cit. 
66 Commission official A (DG DEVCO Brussels), op. cit. 
67 See Particip, op. cit., p. 290 for an overview of the core objectives of BOMCA 4 to BOMCA 
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best placed to meet. This reasoning is in line with the efficiency considerations that 
lay behind the EU’s original decision to delegate and redelegate implementing 
responsibility to the UNDP. Finally, in contrast to 2003, when the decision was first 
made to employ the UNDP, there now exist other actors with the capacity to 
implement the programme. GIZ, for example, has developed a degree of expertise 
in the area of security sector reform68 and has boosted its regional presence 
significantly with projects like CADAP among others. This has seen the agency 
emerge as a viable alternative to the UNDP for the implementation of BOMCA. 
That said, the prospects of implementation by an EU member state consortium were 
criticised by the BOMCA officials interviewed, with the outlook for BOMCA 9 
described as “problematic” by one.69 They pointed to the mixed experience of 
CADAP as a potential scenario for BOMCA 9. Indeed, since the completion of 
CADAP 5 well over a year ago the programme has been inactive. Meanwhile, 
interviewees cited a lack of local knowledge, rigidness, and unpreparedness on the 
part of GIZ staff as leading to low beneficiary satisfaction with the project.70 BOMCA 
interviewees also warned of difficulties during the handover process. Any 
organisation or consortium taking over responsibility for the implementation of 
BOMCA from the UNDP will have significant obstacles to deal with. Because all of the 
equipment utilised by the UNDP was handed over to the beneficiaries on 29 June 
2014, the new implementing organisation will have to procure all of the necessary 
equipment itself.71 The next phase will also have to source new staff with the requisite 
expertise, local knowledge, and language skills.  
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the effectiveness of BOMCA could suffer 
through implementation by a member state consortium. First, BOMCA will no longer 
be able to rely on its experienced staff, some of whom were working on the 
programme since the UNDP began implementation in 2004, and who enjoy excellent 
local knowledge, experience and relationships with the beneficiary governments. 
Second, the EU will no longer have access to the free “policy input and guidance” 
that the UNDP offered thanks to its extensive presence in the region.72 Third, in 
financial terms, implementation by a member state consortium will be more 
                                                          
68 Commission official C (EUD Bishkek), op. cit. 
69 Interview with BOMCA official 2, Regional Programme Management Office, via telephone, 
25 March 2014. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., confirmed by Commission official A (DG DEVCO Brussels), op. cit. 
72 Gavrilis, Central Asia’s Border Woes, op. cit., pp. 20-21. 
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expensive. The UNDP took a smaller cut of the EU’s contribution than what would be 
requested by a member state consortium – approximately seven per cent, versus 
twenty per cent for the latter – while the UNDP also financed around ten per cent of 
BOMCA’s budget. 
Considering all of the anticipated obstacles related to a change of implementing 
partner, it is worth considering other motives for the transfer of implementing 
responsibilities. Importantly, implementation of BOMCA 9 by a member state 
consortium will enhance the EU’s visibility as project donor. In large part, visibility is a 
means to another means – political influence.73 The link between visibility and 
political influence was acknowledged explicitly by one Commission official in an EU 
Delegation and was placed in the context of the EU’s wider ambitions to become a 
political player on the world stage.74 Political influence is the instrument through 
which the ultimate objectives of the EU’s Central Asia Strategy are to be achieved, 
from democratisation and development, to strengthened energy links.75 Crucially, 
Central Asia is more and more considered by the EU’s member states and by the EU 
to be a region of strategic significance. It hosts a range of opportunities, challenges 
and threats, as an emerging energy source, major drug trafficking route, ethnic 
pressure cooker, and potential terrorist breeding-ground. 
Ultimately, there is a perception on the EU’s part that the experts with the UNDP are 
not able to ensure maximum visibility for the EU’s contribution. For the Commission 
official interviewed in Brussels, the visibility question is not resolved with the pasting of 
twelve stars onto documents and equipment; it also extends to the identity of the 
experts who are fielded.76 In the case of BOMCA they were – for the most part – 
neither Europeans, nor employees of European organisations, nor functionaries of 
national European administrations. They were therefore not able to fully transmit an 
image of an EU project. The EU’s sensitivity in this respect is showcased by the 
controversy that erupted over the UNDP’s appointment of a non-European to the 
position of Regional Programme Manager in 2008, which elicited complaints from the 
                                                          
73 Political influence, of course, may in turn serve as a means to innumerable ends, from 
economic concessions, security cooperation, diplomatic coordination, etc.  
74 Commission official C (EUD Bishkek), op. cit. 
75 European Union, The European Union and Central Asia: A New Partnership in Action, op. 
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Commission in Brussels as well as from EU member state embassies in the region.77 It is 
also validated by an incident from 2008 when the Commission’s Head of Delegation 
to Kazakhstan, on a visit to a BOMCA-built border crossing point on the Tajik-Afghan 
border, met with a Tajik border guard who enthusiastically praised the generosity of 
the UNDP!78 By contrast, implementation by an EU member state consortium offers 
opportunities to the EU to strengthen its visibility as project donor. Since no member 
state development agency is close to enjoying the same ‘brand recognition’ as the 
UNDP in Central Asia, the EU will not have to face the same competition with its 
implementing organisation(s) for visibility. 
The EU’s quest for visibility in the context of BOMCA has to be situated within the 
broader efforts by which the EU is seeking to establish itself as a global actor. These 
efforts include the development and strengthening of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Significant in this 
regard is the Treaty of Lisbon, which was agreed upon in 2007 and entered into force 
in December 2009 and which represents the clearest manifestation of the EU’s global 
ambitions to date. Along with the double-hatting of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the establishment of the post of 
European Council President, the provisions within the Treaty for the establishment of a 
European External Action Service (EEAS) are probably the most significant in this 
regard.79 On paper, the EEAS gives the EU a diplomatic identity that is separate from 
its member states, as well as an independent capacity for action. This new 
diplomatic identity has enabled the EU – no longer just the Commission – to establish 
a ‘presence’ abroad.80 At the same time, the capacity of the EEAS, while far from 
optimal, has improved the EU’s ‘capabilities’ for action.81 Both developments have 
enhanced the EU’s ‘actorness’ in international relations,82 with the result that the EU is 
                                                          
77 Gavrilis, Beyond BOMCA, op. cit., pp. 3-4. Although the UNDP was forced to back down, 
the programme was delayed for almost a year while a replacement was sought. 
78 Interview with BOMCA official 3, Tajikistan country team, via telephone, 30 March 2014. 
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the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service”, (2010/427/EU), 
Official Journal of the European Union, L 201/30, 3 August 2010. 
80 C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London: Routledge, 
1999, p. 33. 
81 Ibid., pp. 37-42. 
82 Ibid., pp. 32-45. 
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better suited to exert political influence, and therefore more eager to strive for 
maximum visibility as an external assistance donor.  
Interestingly, the Council Decision establishing the EEAS was only passed in July 
2010.83 Accordingly, the EEAS did not exist when the decision to delegate 
responsibility to the UNDP for BOMCA 8 was taken some time in 2009. With the 
Council Decision, the programming of the Development and Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI), through which the Border Management Programme in Central Asia 
is funded, became a responsibility shared between the European Commission (DG 
DEVCO) and the EEAS. Now, the EEAS is responsible for delivering the country and 
regional strategy papers and the multi-annual indicative programmes falling under 
the DCI.84 Although on paper the Commission retains control over the 
implementation and evaluation of DCI programmes,85 it is possible that the recently-
created EEAS – with its stronger political orientation, as opposed to the more 
technical bent of the European Commission – swayed the Commission in favour of 
an EU member state consortium for the implementation of BOMCA 9. 
As a side note relevant to one of the motives falling under a logic of 
consequentiality, a desire for visibility on the part of the EU and its member states 
might be considered the mirror image of ‘blame shifting’. While ‘blame shifting’ 
involves the delegation of authority to avoid blame in case something goes wrong, 
in the case of BOMCA the EU has chosen to transfer authority to an agent closer to 
itself and its member states, in order to associate itself more fully with the programme 
and reap the associated benefits in terms of visibility and, ultimately, political 
influence. The inverse of ‘blame shifting’, such a manoeuvre might be described as 
‘credit taking’. Finally, regarding the last of the PA motives for delegation identified 
above, none of those interviewed cited differences in preferences between the 
UNDP and member state development organisations as playing a factor in the 
decision to transfer implementing authority. 
Normative institutionalism might provide a supplementary explanation for the EU’s 
decision to terminate its operational relationship with the UNDP in the context of 
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BOMCA. However, for this it is necessary to return to the EU’s relationship with the UN 
and the UNDP more generally. More research would no doubt be needed to 
determine the extent to which the delegation of external assistance programmes to 
UN organisations, and to the UNDP in particular, can be described as an institution. 
Were one to assume that it can be described as such, the EU’s decision to terminate 
its relationship with the UNDP in the context of BOMCA – and earlier, with CADAP – 
could be regarded as a behavioural deviation from the logic of appropriateness 
conditioned by this institution.86 These deviations may be simple anomalies, or they 
may be harbingers of institutional change within the EU, whereby UN organisations 
could cease to be regarded as the most ‘appropriate’ agents in situations where the 
delegation of external assistance programmes is being decided. Though potentially 
significant, and perhaps in line with the changing identity of the EU as it becomes a 
more political actor in international relations, more research would be needed to 
support such a conclusion. For its part, this paper would prefer to underline the 
primary role of a consequentialist logic, and the shifting motives falling thereunder, in 
determining the EU’s choice of implementing partners for BOMCA. 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the motives behind, first, the EU’s successive decisions to 
delegate responsibility for the implementation of the Border Management 
Programme in Central Asia to the UNDP, and, second, the Union’s subsequent 
decision to drop the UNDP as implementing partner in favour of an EU member state 
consortium. To this end, this paper has drawn on two approaches: a principal-agent 
approach, whose account of delegation decisions relies on a logic of 
consequentiality under which a number of concrete motives may shelter; and a 
normative institutionalist approach, which posits that such decisions are determined 
by institutions broadly defined through the logic of appropriateness that they 
engender. 
Both the decisions to delegate (and redelegate) responsibility to the UNDP and the 
decision to transfer implementing authority to an EU member state consortium were 
primarily driven by the same logic of consequentiality. There was little evidence to 
suggest that the repeated decisions to delegate to the UNDP were shaped by a 
logic of appropriateness among the decision-makers in the European Commission, 
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though data underlining the depth of cooperation between the EU and UN 
organisations may suggest that delegation of external assistance programmes to 
them has become something of an institution.87 For this first set of decisions, efficiency 
considerations – related to the UNDP’s local implantation, diplomatic accreditation 
and, from phase 5 on, past performance – and, secondarily, the similar preferences 
of the EU and the UN – or their ‘common agenda’ – were identified as the most 
significant motives for delegation. Regarding the normative institutionalist account of 
delegation, the most that might be supposed is that the similar preferences of the 
UNDP influenced the decision to delegate not only thanks to a consequentialist logic 
encapsulated by the ally principle, but also due to a logic of appropriateness, 
whereby delegation to organisations which share the EU’s preferences for human 
rights, transparency, etc. is viewed as appropriate. While logical, more research 
would be required to support such a supposition. 
It appears that a logic of consequentiality also informed the decision to terminate 
the relationship with the UNDP. Interestingly, while efficiency considerations were 
cited as motives by interviewees from the EU, the efficiency gains from a transfer of 
implementing responsibilities are far from clear. Meanwhile, little evidence was found 
that preference considerations and ‘blame shifting’ played a significant role in the 
EU’s decision.  
Crucially, increasing the EU’s visibility as project donor arose as a significant motive, 
one that can be situated within the broader trends of EU foreign policy. No longer 
content to be a back-office benefactor, the EU is more and more attempting to 
impose its brand. Applied to Central Asia specifically, the EU’s pursuit of political 
influence is manifest in its Central Asia Strategy – which rests on a solid EU presence in 
the region – and is sustained by the increasing perception among member states 
that Central Asia is a region of strategic interest in which the EU needs to develop a 
political footprint. More broadly, the Union’s quest for greater visibility has been 
driven by the development of a more political foreign policy exemplified by the 
establishment of the EEAS. The instauration of this Service – which has challenged the 
Commission’s monopoly of external assistance programming – and the decision to 
drop the UNDP as implementing partner may be connected.  
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Time will tell if similar decisions will be made for the future implementation of other 
external assistance programmes, in Central Asia and elsewhere. Indeed, for future 
research, the question may not be one of logics, but one of motives. The EU is 
certainly facing choices. It might, as it has traditionally done, opt for implementing 
partners offering the most efficient services; or it may instead choose partners out of 
a concern for maximising its visibility in its regions of interest and the world at large. 
The two motives need not be contradictory; efficient external assistance 
programmes are, after all, good for the EU’s image. However, where the EU is 
unsatisfied with the visibility offered by the UNDP or other agents enjoying high brand 
recognition, it ought to be sure – before transferring implementing responsibilities for 
a programme – that alternative agencies with sufficient capacities exist to undertake 
the assigned tasks efficiently. 
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